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Abstract
In multiagent learning, agents interact in inherently nonstationary environments
due to their concurrent policy updates. It is, therefore, paramount to develop
and analyze algorithms that learn effectively despite these nonstationarities. A
number of works have successfully conducted this analysis under the lens of
evolutionary game theory (EGT), wherein a population of individuals interact and
evolve based on biologically-inspired operators. These studies have mainly focused
on establishing connections to value-iteration based approaches in stateless or
tabular games. We extend this line of inquiry to formally establish links between
EGT and policy gradient (PG) methods, which have been extensively applied in
single and multiagent learning. We pinpoint weaknesses of the commonly-used
softmax PG algorithm in adversarial and nonstationary settings and contrast PG’s
behavior to that predicted by replicator dynamics (RD), a central model in EGT.
We consequently provide theoretical results that establish links between EGT and
PG methods, then derive Neural Replicator Dynamics (NeuRD), a parameterized
version of RD that constitutes a novel method with several advantages. First, as
NeuRD reduces to the well-studied no-regret Hedge algorithm in the tabular setting,
it inherits no-regret guarantees that enable convergence to equilibria in games.
Second, NeuRD is shown to be more adaptive to nonstationarity, in comparison
to PG, when learning in canonical games and imperfect information benchmarks
including Poker. Thirdly, modifying any PG-based algorithm to use the NeuRD
update rule is straightforward and incurs no added computational costs. Finally,
while single-agent learning is not the main focus of the paper, we verify empirically
that NeuRD is competitive in these settings with a recent baseline algorithm.
1 Introduction
In multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents interact in a shared environment and aim to
learn policies that maximize their returns [15, 48, 62]. The associated core challenge is that the
agents’ concurrent learning implies that they each perceive the environment as nonstationary [37, 62].
It has been suggested that enabling agents to adapt to nonstationary environments, rather than
merely learn static policies, is the paramount objective in multiagent learning [54, 61]. Recent
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works have made considerable progress in increasing the scalability of MARL algorithms and the
complexity of application domains. These include approaches relying on self-play [23], regret
minimization [9, 10, 12, 34, 43, 69], and a large body of works that assume a standard centralized
learning, decentralized execution paradigm [18, 35, 44, 51]. However, approaches such as Neural
Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP) [23] and Deep CFR [12] rely on maintenance of extremely large data
buffers; continual re-solving approaches such as DeepStack [43] and Libratus [10] are restricted to
finite-horizon domains with enumerable belief spaces; and centralized learning approaches assume
team-wide shared knowledge of experiences or policies. Most other works that focus on nonstationary
multiagent learning are limited to repeated and stochastic games [1, 15, 24, 46, 47].
This paper focuses on model-free learning in the context of nonstationary games. Specifically, we
leverage insights from evolutionary game theory (EGT) [26, 38, 70] to develop our proposed algorithm.
EGT models the interactions of a population of individuals that have minimal knowledge of opponent
strategies or preferences, and has proven vital for not only the analysis and evaluation of MARL
agents [45, 50, 66, 67], but also the development of novel algorithms [64]. Links between EGT and
MARL have been primarily identified between the Replicator Dynamics (RD), a standard model in
EGT, and simple policy iteration algorithms such as Cross Learning and Learning Automata [4, 5, 65],
value-iteration algorithms such as Q-learning in stateless cases [27, 63], and no-regret learning [29].
In this paper, we go beyond these simple settings and focus our analysis on the connections between
EGT and Policy Gradient (PG) algorithms, which have been extensively applied to MARL [2, 7, 8, 18,
35, 55, 57]. We first establish links between the RD, PG methods, and online learning, enabling new
interpretations of these approaches. We use these links to identify a key limitation in commonly-used
softmax PG-based methods that prevents their rapid adaptation in nonstationary settings, in contrast
to RD. Given this insight, we derive a new PG method, called Neural Replicator Dynamics (NeuRD).
We prove that in the tabular setting, NeuRD reduces to Hedge, a well-studied no-regret learning
algorithm. We then introduce a variant of NeuRD that enables model-free learning in sequential
imperfect information games. We empirically evaluate NeuRD in canonical and sequential games.
By including variants of each where reward spaces are nonstationary, we demonstrate that NeuRD
is not only more stable when learning in fixed games, but also more adaptive under nonstationarity
compared to standard PG. Moreover, though not the focus of the paper, we demonstrate that NeuRD
matches state-of-the-art performance in a suite of complex stationary single-agent tasks. Critically,
the conversion of standard PG-based algorithms to the NeuRD update rule is simple, involving
changes to few lines of code. These features make NeuRD a strong alternative to usual PG algorithms
in nonstationary environments, such as in MARL or for computing equilibria in games.
2 Preliminaries
This section briefly introduces the necessary game-theoretic and reinforcement learning background.
2.1 Game Theory
Game theory studies strategic interactions of players. A normal-form game (NFG) specifies the
simultaneous interaction of K players with corresponding action sets {A1, . . . ,AK}. The payoff
function u :
∏K
k=1Ak 7→ RK assigns a numerical utility to each player for each possible joint
action a .= (a1, . . . , aK), where ak ∈ Ak for all k ∈ [K] .= {1, . . . ,K}. Let pik ∈ ∆|A|
denote the k-th player’s mixed strategy. The expected utility for player k given strategy profile
pi
.
= (pi1, . . . ,piK) is then u¯k(pi) .= Epi[uk(a)|a ∼ pi]. The best response for player k given pi is
BRk(pi−k) = arg maxpik [u¯
k((pik,pi−k))], where pi−k is the set of opponent policies. Profile pi∗ is
a Nash equilibrium if pik∗ = BR
k(pi−k∗ ) for all k ∈ [K]. A useful metric for evaluating policies is
NASHCONV(pi) =
∑
k maxpik [u¯
k((pik,pi−k))]− u¯k(pi) [32].
2.2 Replicator Dynamics
Replicator Dynamics (RD) are a key concept from EGT, which describe how a population evolves
through time based on biologically-inspired operators, such as selection and mutation [26, 59, 60, 71,
72]. The single-population RD are defined by the following system of differential equations:
p˙it(a) = pit(a)
[
u(a,pit)− u¯(pit)
] ∀i ∈ A, (1)
2
Each component of pit determines the proportion of an action (or pure strategy) a being played in the
population at time t. The time derivative of each component a is proportional to the difference in its
expected payoff, u(a,pit), and the average population payoff, u¯(pit) =
∑
a∈A pit(a)u(a,pit).
2.3 Online Learning
Online learning examines the performance of learning prediction algorithms in potentially adversarial
environments. On each round, t, the learner samples an action, at ∈ A from a discrete set of actions,
A, according to a policy, pit ∈ ∆|A|, and receives utility, ut(a) ∈ R, where ut ∈ R|A| is a bounded
vector provided by the environment. A typical objective is for the learner to minimize its expected
regret in hindsight for not committing to a ∈ A after T rounds; the regret is defined as
RT (a)
.
=
T∑
t=1
ut(a)− pit · ut.
Algorithms that guarantee their average worst-case regret goes to zero as the number of rounds
increases, i.e., RT ∈ o (T ), are called no-regret; these algorithms learn optimal policies under fixed
or stochastic environments. According to a folk theorem, the average policies of no-regret algorithms
in self-play or against best responses converge to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games
(e.g., see Waugh [68, Section 2.2.1]). This result can be extended from matrix games to sequential
imperfect information games by composing learners in a tree and defining utility as counterfactual
value [25, 73]. We provide background on sequential games in Appendix A for completeness.
The family of no-regret algorithms known as Follow the Regularized Leader (FoReL) [39, 40, 52, 53]
generalizes well-known decision making algorithms and population dynamics. For a discrete action
set, A, FoReL is defined through the following updates:
pit
.
= arg max
pi′∈∆|A|
[pi′ · yt−1 − h(pi′)]
yt
.
= yt−1 + ηtut,
where ηt > 0 is the learning rate at timestep t, ut ∈ R|A| is the vector of action utilities observed at t,
and the regularizer h is a convex function. Note that this algorithm assumes that the learner observes
the entire action utility vector at each timestep rather than only the reward for taking a particular
action. This is known as the full information or all-actions setting.
Under negative entropy regularization h(pi) =
∑
a pi(a) log pi(a), policy pit reduces to a softmax
function pit
.
= Π(yt−1), where Π(z) ∝ exp(z),∀z ∈ R|A|. This yields the well-known Hedge [19]
algorithm:
piT
.
= Π
(
T−1∑
t=1
ηtut
)
. (2)
Hedge is no-regret as long as ηt ∈ O(1/√t). Likewise, the continuous-time FoReL dynamics [41] are
pit
.
= arg max
pi′∈∆|A|
[
pi′ · yt − h(pi′)
]
y˙t
.
= ut (3)
which in the case of entropy regularization yields RD as defined in (1) (e.g., see [41]). This implies
that RD is no-regret, thereby enjoying equilibration to Nash and convergence to the optimal prediction
in the time-average.
2.4 Reinforcement Learning and Policy Gradient (PG)
In a Markov Decision Process, at each timestep t, an agent in state st ∈ S selects an action at ∈ A,
receives a reward rt ∈ R, then transitions to a new state st+1 ∼ T (s, a, s′). In the discounted infinite-
horizon regime, the reinforcement learning (RL) objective is to learn a policy pi : s→ ∆|A|, which
maximizes the expected return vpi(s) = Epi[
∑∞
k=t γ
k−trk|st = s], with discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1).
In actor-critic algorithms, one generates trajectories according to some parameterized policy pi(·|s;θ)
while learning to estimate the action-value function qpi(s, a) = Epi[
∑∞
k=t γ
k−trk|st = s, at = a].
3
Temporal difference learning [58] can be used to learn an action-value function estimator, qpi(s, a;w),
which is parameterized by w. A PG algorithm then updates policy pi parameters θ in the direction of
the gradient ∇θ log pi(at|st;θ)
[
qpi(st, at;w)− vpi(st;w)
]
, where the quantity in square brackets is
defined as the advantage, denoted A(at;θ,w), and vpi(st;w)
.
=
∑
b pi(st, bt;θ)q
pi(st, bt;w). The
advantage is analogous to regret in the online learning literature. In sample-based learning, the PG
update incorporates a (pi(at|st;θ))−1 factor that accounts for the fact that at was sampled from pi.
The all-actions PG algorithm without this factor is then ∇θpi(·|st;θ)
[
qpi(st, ·;w) − vpi(st;w)1
]
,
where 1 is a column vector of 1s. While different policy parameterizations are possible, the most
common choice for discrete decision problems is a softmax function over the logits, pi(·|st;θ) .=
Π(y(·|st;θ)), and we focus the rest of our analysis on this form of PG.
PG-based methods learn policies directly, handle continuous actions seamlessly, and combine readily
with deep learning to solve high-dimensional tasks [58]. These benefits have, in part, led to the success
of recent PG-based algorithms (e.g., A3C [42], IMPALA [17], MADDPG [35], and COMA [18]).
3 A Unifying Perspective on Replicator Dynamics and Policy Gradient
This section motivates and introduces a novel algorithm, Neural Replicator Dynamics (NeuRD), then
presents unifying theoretical results for NeuRD, online learning, RD, and PG.
3.1 Learning Dynamics under RD and PG
Let us consider the strengths and weaknesses of the algorithms described thus far. While RD and
the closely-related FoReL are no-regret and enable learning of equilibria in games, they are limited
in application to tabular settings. By contrast, PG is applicable to high-dimensional single and
multiagent RL domains. Unfortunately, PG suffers from the fact that increasing the probability
of taking an action which already has low probability mass can be very slow, in contrast to the
considered no-regret algorithms. We can see this by writing out the single state, tabular, all-actions
PG update explicitly, using the notation of online learning to identify the correspondences to that
literature. On round t, PG updates its logits and policy as
pit
.
= Π(yt−1)
yt
.
= yt−1 + ηt∇yt−1pit · ut.
As there is no action or state sampling in this setting, shifting all the payoffs by the expected
value u¯ (or vpi in RL terms) has no impact on the policy, so this term is omitted here. Noting that
∂pit(a
′)/∂yt−1(a) = pit(a
′) [1a′=a − pit(a)] [58, Section 2.8], we observe that the update direction,
∇yt−1pit · ut, is actually the instantaneous regret scaled by pit, yielding the concrete update:1
yt(a) = yt−1(a) + ηtpit(a)
[
ut(a)−
∑
a′∈A
pit(a
′)ut(a′)
]
. (4)
See Appendix C.1 for details. Scaling the regret by pit leads to an update that can prevent PG from
achieving reasonable performance in even simple environments.
The fact that the update includes a pit scaling factor can hinder learning in nonstationary settings
(e.g., in games) when an action might be safely disregarded at first, but later the value of this action
improves. We illustrate this adaptability issue in the game of Rock–Paper–Scissors, by respectively
comparing the dynamics of RD and PG in Figs. 1a and 1b; note the differences near the vertices,
where a single action retains a majority of policy mass. Figure 1c compares the speeds of the
dynamics by plotting the ratio ‖p˙iRD‖/‖p˙iPG‖. This example illustrates the practical issues that arise
when using PG in settings where learning has converged to a near-deterministic policy and then must
adapt to a different policy given, e.g., dynamic payoffs or opponents. While PG fails to adapt rapidly
to the game at hand, RD does not exhibit this issue.
Given these insights, our objective is to derive an algorithm that combines the best of both worlds, in
that it is theoretically-grounded and adaptive in the manner of RD, while still enjoying the practical
benefits of the parametric PG update rule in RL applications.
1This scaling by pit is also apparent when taking the continuous-time limit of PG dynamics (see Appendix B).
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(a) Replicator dynamics.
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(c) Comparison of dynamics speeds.
Figure 1: Learning dynamics of (a) RD and (b) PG dynamics in Rock–Paper-Scissors. In (c) we
compare the the speed of RD and PG, i.e., ‖p˙iRD‖/‖p˙iPG‖. When policies are near-deterministic (i.e.,
near the simplex boundaries), RD is notably more adaptive than PG.
3.2 NeuRD: Neural Replicator Dynamics
While we have highlighted key limitations of PG in comparison to RD, the latter has limited
practicality when computational updates are inherently discrete-time or a parameterized policy
is desired for generalizability. To address these limitations, we derive a discrete-time parameterized
policy update rule, titled Neural Replicator Dynamics (NeuRD), which is later compared against PG.
For seamless comparison of our update rule to standard PG, we next switch our nomenclature from
the utilities used in online learning, u(a), to the analogous action-values used in RL, qpi(a). We write
the RD (i.e., FoReL with entropy regularization) logit dynamics (3) as
y˙(a) = qpi(a)− vpi, (5)
where vpi is the standard variance-reducing baseline [58]. Let yt(a;θ) denote the logits parameterized
by θ. A natural way to derive a parametric update rule is to compute the Euler discretization2 of (5),
yt(a)
.
= yt−1(a;θ) + η
(
qpit(a)− vpit),
and consider yt(a) a fixed target value that the parameterized logits yt−1(a;θ) are adjusted toward.
Specifically, one can update θ to minimize some choice of metric d(·, ·),
θt = θt−1 −
∑
a
∇θd(yt(a), yt−1(a;θ)).
In particular, minimizing the Euclidean distance yields,
θt = θt−1 −
∑
a
∇θ 1
2
‖yt(a)− yt−1(a;θ)‖2
= θt−1 +
∑
a
(yt(a)− yt−1(a;θ))∇θyt−1(a;θ)
= θt−1 + η
∑
a
∇θyt−1(a;θ)
(
qpi(a)− vpi), (6)
which we later prove has a rigorous connection to Hedge and, thereby, inherits the no-regret guarantees
that are useful in nonstationary settings such as games. As our experiments use a neural network
parameterization, we refer to the update rule (6) as Neural Replicator Dynamics (NeuRD).
3.3 Properties and Unifying Theorems
Overall, NeuRD is not only practical to use as it involves a simple modification of PG with no added
computational expense, but also benefits from rigorous links to algorithms with no-regret guarantees,
as shown in this section. All proofs are in Appendix C.
We first consider the single state, tabular case to make a key connection to no-regret algorithms.
Theorem 1. Single state, all-actions, tabular NeuRD is Hedge.
2Given a tabular softmax policy, this definition matches the standard discrete-time RD. See Appendix C.5.
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As a reminder, Hedge (and therefore tabular NeuRD) is no-regret, so NeuRD can be used to find
optimal policies or Nash equilibria. In sequential decision making settings, ensuring no-regret
requires independent learners at every decision point, and additionally a counterfactual weighting
of utilities in imperfect information games (IIGs) [73]; for completeness, we provide the necessary
background on this in Appendix A. At a high level, in IIGs the set of information states Sk for player
k ∈ [K] corresponds to a partitioning of action histories, and counterfactual values are defined as
the expected player utility weighted by the product of opponent sequence probabilities. With these
changes, applying NeuRD to imperfect information settings is trivial, as shown in our experiments.
These facts ensure that tabular NeuRD can be used to solve a broad class of problems where PG may
fail. While these guarantees are limited to the tabular case, they constitute a principled theoretical
grounding on which parameterized NeuRD is constructed.
We next formalize the connection between RD and PG, expanding beyond the scope of prior works
that have considered only the links between EGT and value-iteration based algorithms [27, 63].
Proposition 1. PG is a policy-level Euler discretization approximation of continuous-time RD (i.e.,
computing pit+1 using pit), under a KL-divergence minimization criterion.
Next we establish a formal link between NeuRD and Natural Policy Gradient (NPG) [28].
Proposition 2. The NeuRD update rule (6) corresponds to a naturalized policy gradient rule, in the
sense that NeuRD applies a natural gradient only at the policy output level of softmax function over
logits, and uses the standard gradient otherwise.
Unlike NPG, NeuRD does not require computation of the inverse Fisher information matrix, which is
especially expensive when, e.g., the policy is parameterized by a large-scale neural network [36].
Empirical Remarks. As in average, the logits y get incremented by the advantage, they may
diverge to ±∞. To avoid numerical issues, in practice one can stop updating the logits if the gap
between them exceeds a large threshold. We apply this by using the following clipped gradient in
lieu of a standard gradient:
∇˜θ(z(θ), η, β) .= [η∇θz(θ)]I{z(θ) + η∇θz(θ) ∈ [−β, β]},
where I{·} is the indicator function, η > 0 is a learning rate, and β ∈ R controls the allowable logits
gap. This thresholding is not problematic at the policy representation level, since actions can have a
probability arbitrarily close to 0 or 1 given a large enough β. Moreover, while we have so far assumed
an all-actions NeuRD update, a corresponding sample-based variant, where at ∼ pi(a;θ), is given by
θt = θt−1 +
∇˜θ
(
y(at;θ)(q
pi(a)− vpi), η, β)
pi(at;θ) + ε
,
where ε > 0 is a variance-reduction term, useful since the update rule scales inversely with action
selection probability pi(at;θ), which may be close to 0 for certain actions.
4 Evaluation
We conduct a series of evaluations demonstrating the effectiveness of NeuRD when learning in
nonstationary settings such as NFGs, standard imperfect information benchmarks, and variants of
each with additional reward nonstationarity. As NeuRD involves only a simple modification of the
PG update rule to improve adaptivity, we focus our comparisons against standard PG as a baseline,
noting that additional benefits can be analogously gained by combining NeuRD with more intricate
techniques that improve PG (e.g., variance reduction, improved exploration, or off-policy learning).
Experimental procedures are detailed in Appendix D.1.
We consider several domains. Rock–Paper–Scissors (RPS) is a well-known canonical NFG involv-
ing two players, with a cyclic dominance among the three strategies. Goofspiel is a card game where
players try to obtain point cards by bidding simultaneously. We use an imperfect information variant
with 4 cards where bid cards are not revealed [30]. Kuhn Poker is a game wherein each player starts
with 2 chips, antes 1 chip to play, receives a face-down card from a deck of K + 1 such that one card
remains hidden, and either bets (raise or call) or folds until all players are in (contributed equally to
the pot) or out (folded). Amongst those that are in, the player with the highest-ranked card wins the
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Figure 2: (a) NASHCONV of the average NeuRD and PG policies in biased RPS. (b) NASHCONV of
the sequence-probability average policies of tabular, all-actions, counterfactual value NeuRD and PG
in two-player Leduc Poker.
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Figure 3: (a) RPS payoffs, where the choice of ν ∈ R induces payoff bias. (b) RD trajectories
in biased RPS with ν = 20, Nash shown as red dot. (c) Time-average policy NASHCONV in
nonstationary RPS, with the three game phases separated by vertical dashed red lines.
pot. In Leduc Poker [56], players instead have limitless chips, one initial private card, and ante 1
chip to play. Bets are limited to 2 and 4 chips, respectively, in the first and second round, with two
raises maximum in each round. A public card is revealed before the second round. Though not the
primary focus of the paper, we also provide empirical results for single-agent stationary RL tasks in
Appendix D.3, with the key observation being that updating the recently-introduced IMPALA [17]
agent to use the NeuRD update rule matches state-of-the-art performance.
We first show that the differences between NeuRD and PG detailed in Section 3.3 are more than
theoretical. Consider the NASHCONV of the time-average NeuRD and PG tabular policies in the
game of RPS, shown in Fig. 2a. Note that by construction, NeuRD and RD are equivalent in this
tabular, single-state setting. NeuRD not only converges towards the Nash equilibrium faster, but PG
eventually plateaus. Consider next a more complex imperfect information setting, where Fig. 2 shows
that tabular, all-actions, counterfactual value NeuRD3 more quickly and more closely approximates a
Nash equilibrium in two-player Leduc Poker than tabular, all-actions, counterfactual value PG.
We next consider modifications of our domains wherein reward functions change at specific intervals
during learning, compounding the usual nonstationarities in games. Specifically, we consider games
with three phases, wherein learning commences under a particular reward function, after which it
switches to a different function in each phase while learning continues without the policies being
reset. In biased RPS, each phase corresponds to a particular choice of the parameter ν in payoff tables
Fig. 3a; specifically, we set ν to 20, 0, and 20, respectively, for the three phases. This has the effect of
biasing the Nash equilibrium towards one of the simplex corners (see Fig. 3c), then to the simplex
center (Fig. 1a), then back again towards the corner. In Fig. 3c, we plot the NASHCONV of NeuRD
and PG with respect to the Nash for that particular phase. Despite the changing payoffs, the NeuRD
NASHCONV decreases towards 0 in each of the phases, while PG again plateaus.
Finally, we consider imperfect information games, with the reward function being iteratively negated
in each game phase for added nonstationarity, and policies parameterized using neural networks.
Due to the complexity of maintaining a time-average neural network policy to ensure no-regret,
we use entropy regularization to induce realtime policy convergence towards the Nash (e.g., as
done by Srinivasan et al. [57]). Figure 4 illustrates the NASHCONV for NeuRD and PG for the
3This can be seen as counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) [73] with Hedge, also see Brown et al. [11].
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Figure 4: Comparison of NeuRD and PG NASHCONV in nonstationary imperfect information games.
Vertical red dashed lines separate the phases with different reward functions for each game.
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Figure 5: Comparison of NeuRD and PG NASHCONV AUC in the three phases of nonstationary-
reward Leduc Poker, over 40 independent trials each.
imperfect information domains considered, for an intermediate level of entropy regularization. NeuRD
converges faster than PG in all three domains. Appendix D.2 provides full sweeps over the entropy
regularization parameter; as regularization increases, so does the rate of convergence, although to a
fixed point further from the Nash. In Fig. 5, we plot the NASHCONV area-under-the-curve (AUC) for
all game phases in nonstationary Leduc, and for all entropy regularization levels. Notably, NeuRD
is significantly more stable in learning than PG, even without entropy regularization. Of particular
note is Phase II of the game, wherein PG fails to match NeuRD’s performance for any value of
regularization.
5 Discussion
This paper rigorously investigated the links between RD and PG methods, extending prior inquiries
between EGT and value-iteration based methods. The insights gained led to the introduction of a
novel algorithm, NeuRD, that generalizes the no-regret Hedge algorithm and RD to utilize function
approximation. NeuRD was empirically shown to better cope in highly nonstationary and adversarial
settings than PG. While NeuRD represents an important extension of classical learning dynamics
to utilize function approximation, Hedge and RD are also instances of the more general FoReL
framework that applies to arbitrary convex decision sets and problem geometries expressed through a
regularization function. This connection suggests that NeuRD could perhaps likewise be generalized
to convex decision sets and various parametric forms, which would allow a general FoReL-like
method to take advantage of functional representations. Moreover, as NeuRD is practical in that it
involves a very simple modification of the standard PG update rule, a natural avenue for future work
is to investigate NeuRD-based extensions of standard PG-based methods (e.g., A3C [42], DDPG [33],
and MADDPG [35]), in addition to naturally nonstationary single-agent RL tasks such as intrinsic
motivation-based exploration [22].
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Appendices: Neural Replicator Dynamics
A Background on extensive-form games and counterfactual values
An extensive-form game (EFG) specifies the sequential interaction between players k ∈ [K] ∪ {c},
where c is a special player called chance or nature (also denoted as player 0) who has a fixed
stochastic policy that determines the transition probabilities at random events like dice rolls or the
dealing of cards from a shuffled deck. Actions, a ∈ A (h), are played in turns according to a
player function, τ : H → [K] ∪ {c}, and are recorded in a history, h ∈ H, where H is the set of
all possible action sequences. To model games like Poker that require some actions to be hidden
from particular players, players do not observe the game’s history directly. Instead, histories are
partitioned into information states, s ∈ Sk,Sk ⊆ H, for each player, k ∈ [K] ∪ {c}, according
to function I : H → S,S .= ⋃Kk=1 Sk mapping sets of histories into information states. Player k
must act from s without knowing which particular history led to s. This requires that the set of
actions in each history within an information set must match, so we can define A (s) .= A (h) with
s = I(h), h ∈ H. A behavioral policy for player k maps every s ∈ Sk to a probability distribution
over actions: pik(s) ∈ ∆|A(s)|. Payoffs, uk(z), uk : Z → R, are provided to each player upon
reaching a terminal history, z ∈ Z ⊆ H. We assume finite games so a terminal history is always
eventually reached. We denote the subset of terminal histories that share h as a prefix as Z(h). For
any two histories, h, h′ ∈ H, we use the notation h @ h′ to indicate that history h is a prefix of h′.
We also define state-action values for joint policies. The value qk,pi(s, a) represents the expected
return to player k starting at state s, taking action a, and playing pi. Formally, qk,pi(s, a) .=
Ez∼pi[uk(z) | h ∈ s, h @ z] =
∑
h∈s,z∈Z(h)
Pr(h|s)uk(z) =
∑
h∈s ηpi(h)q
k,pi(h, a)∑
h∈s ηpi(h)
,
where qk,pi(h, a) = Ez∼pi[uk(z) | ha v z] =
∑
h∈s,z∈Z(h) σpi(h, z)u
k(z) is the expected utility
of the ground state-action pair (h, a), and σpi(h) is the probability of reaching h under the profile
pi. We make the common assumption that players have perfect recall, i.e., they do not forget
anything they have observed while playing. Under perfect recall, the distribution of the states can
be obtained only from the opponents’ policies using Bayes’ rule (see Srinivasan et al. [57, Section
3.2]). For convenience, in turn-based games, we define qpi(s, a) .= qτ(s),pi(s, a) and vpi(s) .=∑
a∈A(s) pi
τ(s)(s, a)qpi(s, a).
The probability of reaching any history h ∈ H can be decomposed as the product of player sequence
probabilities, σpi(h) = ΠKk=0Πh′avh,τ(h′)=kpi
k(a|I(h′)). Counterfactual value [73] plays a critical
role in many Nash equilibrium approximation methods and is defined as the expected utility weighted
by the product of opponent sequence probabilities,
qk,pi,c(s, a)
.
=
∑
h∈s
σpi−1(h)q
k,pi(h, a),
with vk,pi,c(s) defined analogously. Policy averaging is also part of many algorithms and is done in
terms of sequence probabilities in EFGs.
In this regime, the policy for player k ∈ [K] on round T in information state s ∈ Sk, is
pikT (·|s) = Π
(
T−1∑
t=1
ηt
(
qk,pit,ct (s, a)− vk,pit,ct (s)
))
,
where ηt > 0 is the learning rate at round t, while q
k,pit,c
t (s, a) and v
k,pit,c
t (s) are, respectively, the
counterfactual action-value and value.
B Comparison of RD and Continuous-time PG Dynamics
We can also consider the continuous-time q-value based policy gradient (QPG) dynamics [57, Section
D.1.1], which are amenable for comparison against the RD and provide a reasonable approximation
to the discrete-time PG models given a sufficiently small learning rate [6]:
p˙i(a;θ) = pi(a;θ)
(
pi(a;θ)A(a,θ,w)−
∑
b
pi(b;θ)2A(b,θ,w)
)
. (7)
In contrast to RD (1), the QPG dynamics in (7) have an additional pi(a;θ) term that modulates
learning and slows adaptation for actions that are taken with low probability under pi.
C Proofs of theoretical results
C.1 Single state, tabular PG update
Here, we fully derive the single state, tabular PG update. On round t, PG updates its logits as
yt
.
= yt−1 + ηt∇yt−1pit · ut.
As there is no action or state sampling in this setting, shifting all the payoffs by the expected
value u¯ (or vpi in RL terms) has no impact on the policy, so this term is omitted here. Noting that
∂pit(a
′)/∂yt−1(a) = pit(a
′) [1a′=a − pit(a)] [58, Section 2.8], we observe that the update direction,
∇yt−1pit · ut, is actually the instantaneous regret scaled by pit:
∂pit
∂yt−1(a)
· ut =
∑
a′∈A
∂pit(a
′)
∂yt−1(a)
ut(a
′)
=
∑
a′∈A
pit(a
′) [1a′=a − pit(a)]ut(a′)
= pit(a) [1− pit(a)]ut(a)−
∑
a′∈A,a′ 6=a
pit(a
′)pit(a)ut(a′)
= pit(a)
[
[1− pit(a)]ut(a)−
∑
a′∈A,a′ 6=a
pit(a
′)ut(a′)
]
= pit(a)
[
ut(a)− pit(a)ut(a)−
∑
a′∈A,a′ 6=a
pit(a
′)ut(a′)
]
= pit(a)
[
ut(a)−
∑
a′∈A
pit(a
′)ut(a′)
]
.
Therefore, the concrete update is:
yt(a) = yt−1(a) + ηtpit(a)
[
ut(a)−
∑
a′∈A
pit(a
′)ut(a′)
]
.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Single state, all-actions, tabular NeuRD is Hedge.
Proof. In the single state, tabular case,∇θtyt(a;θ) is the identity matrix, so unrolling the NeuRD
update (6) across T − 1 rounds, we see that the NeuRD policy is
piT = Π
(
T−1∑
t=1
ηt (ut − ut · pit)
)
= Π
(
T−1∑
t=1
ηtut
)
, (8)
since Π is shift invariant. But (8) is identical to (2), so NeuRD and hedge use the same policy on
every round and are therefore equivalent in this setting.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The following result unifies the Replicator Dynamics and Policy Gradient.
Proposition 1. PG is a policy-level Euler discretization approximation of continuous-time RD (i.e.,
computing pit+1 using pit), under a KL-divergence minimization criterion.
Proof. A discrete-time Euler discretization of the RD at the policy level is:
pit+1
.
= pit 
[
1+ η
(
q − vpit1)].
Note that while
∑
a pit+1(a) = 1, this Euler-discretized update may still be outside the simplex; how-
ever, pit+1 merely provides a target for our parameterized policy piθt update, which is subsequently
reprojected back to the simplex via Π(·).
Now if we consider parameterized policies pit ≈ piθt , and our goal is to define dynamics on
θt that captures those of the RD, a natural way consists in updating θt in order to make piθt
move towards pit+1, for example in the sense of minimizing their KL divergence, KL(p, q)
.
=
p · log p− p · log q,p, q ∈ R+,n, n > 0.
Of course, the KL divergence is defined only when both inputs are in the positive orthant, R+,n,
so in order to measure the divergence from pit+1, which may have negative values, we need to
define a KL-like divergence. Fortunately, since the p · log p is inconsequential from an optimization
perspective and this is the only term that requires p > 0, a natural modification of the KL divergence
to allow for negative values in its first argument is to drop this term entirely, resulting in K˜L(p, q) .=
−p · log q,p ∈ Rn, q ∈ R+,n.
The gradient-descent step on the K˜L(pit+1,piθt) objective is:
θt+1 = θt −∇θK˜L(pit+1,piθt)
= θt +
∑
a
pit+1(a)∇θ log piθt(a)
= θt +
∑
a
pit(a)
[
1 + η
(
q(a)− vpit)]∇θ log piθt(a).
Assuming pit = piθt ,
= θt +
∑
a
piθt(a)
[
1 + η
(
q(a)− vpiθt )]∇θ log piθt(a)
= θt +
∑
a
[
1 + η
(
q(a)− vpiθt )]∇θpiθt(a).
= θt +
(
1− ηvpiθt )∑
a
∇θpiθt(a) + η
∑
a
q(a)∇θpiθt(a).
= θt +
(
1− ηvpiθt )∇θ∑
a
piθt(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+η
∑
a
q(a)∇θpiθt(a).
= θt + η∇θ
∑
a
piθt(a)q(a)
= θt + η∇θvpiθt ,
which is precisely a policy gradient step.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 2
We detail here a unification of the Natural PG and NeuRD update rules.
Proposition 2. The NeuRD update rule (6) corresponds to a naturalized policy gradient rule, in the
sense that NeuRD applies a natural gradient only at the policy output level of softmax function over
logits, and uses the standard gradient otherwise.
Proof. Consider a policy pi(a) defined by a softmax over a set of logits y(a): pi .= Π(y). Define the
Fisher information matrix F of the policy pi with respect to the logits y:
Fa,b =
∑
c
pi(c)(∂y(a) log pi(c))(∂y(b) log pi(c))
=
∑
c
pi(c)(∂y(a)y(c)−
∑
d
pi(d)∂y(a)y(d))(∂y(b)y(c)−
∑
d
pi(d)∂y(b)y(d))
=
∑
c
pi(c)(δa,c −
∑
d
pi(d)δa,d)(δb,c −
∑
d
pi(d)δb,d)
= pi(b)(δa,b − pi(a)).
Note that
(F∇y)(a) =
∑
b
Fa,b∇y(b)
=
∑
b
pi(b)(δa,b − pi(a))∇y(b)
= pi(a)∇y(a)− pi(a)
∑
b
pi(b)∇y(b)
= ∇pi(a)
from the definition of pi. This means that considering the variables y as parameters of the policy, the
natural gradient ∇˜ypi of pi with respect to y is
∇˜ypi = F−1(∇ypi) = F−1(F∇yy) = I.
Now assume the logits yθ are parameterized by some parameter θ (e.g., with a neural network). Let
us define the pseudo-natural gradient of the probabilities pi with respect to θ as the composition of
the natural gradient of pi with respect to y (i.e., the softmax transformation) and the gradient of yθ
with respect to θ:
∇˜θpi = (∇θyθ)(∇˜ypi) = ∇θyθ.
From the above, we have that a natural policy gradient yields:∑
a
∇˜θpi(a)
(
q(a)− vpi) = ∑
a
∇θy(a)
(
q(a)− vpi),
which is nothing else than the NeuRD update rule in (6).
C.5 Equivalence to the standard discrete-time replicator dynamic
A common way to define discrete-time replicator dynamics is according to the so-called standard
discrete-time replicator dynamic [16],
pit(a)
.
= pit−1(a)
eq
pit−1(a)
pit−1 · eqpit−1 .
The action values are exponentiated to ensure all the utility values are positive, which is the typical
assumption required by this model. Since the policy is a softmax function applied to logits, we can
rewrite this dynamic in the tabular case to also recover an equivalent to the NeuRD update rule in (6)
with η = 1:
pit−1(a)
eq
pit−1 (a)
pit−1 · eqpit−1 =
eyt−1(a)+q
pit−1 (a)∑
b e
yt−1(b)
∑
b e
yt−1(b)∑
b e
yt−1(b)+qpit−1 (b)
=
eyt−1(a)+q
pit−1 (a)∑
b e
yt−1(b)+qpit−1 (b)
.
pit is generated from logits, yt(a) = yt−1(a) + qpit−1(a) =
∑t−1
τ=0 q
piτ (a), which only differs from
(6) in a constant shift of vpit−1 across all actions. Since the softmax function is shift invariant, the
sequence of policies generated from these update rules will be identical.
Interestingly, there have been sequence-form extensions of these standard discrete-time replicator
dynamics [20] that are also related to counterfactual regret minimization [31], but with a different
(but similar) regret minimizer. There have also been a sampling variants, such as sequence-form Q-
learning [49], and sequence-form logit dynamics [21], which seems similar to the NeuRD update. The
main benefit of NeuRD over these algorithms is that using counterfactual values allows representing
the policies in behavioral form, as is standard in reinforcement learning, rather than the sequence-form.
As a result, it is straight-forward to do sampling and function approximation.
D Additional Experimental Remarks and Results
D.1 Experimental procedures and reproducibility notes
We detail the experimental procedures here.
For Fig. 1 we simulate the continuous time RD (1) and the continuous time PG dynamics (7) from
regular grid points on the simplex. For Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b we plot 15 trajectories of length tmax = 8;
arrows indicate the direction of evolution. For Fig. 1c we compute ‖p˙iRD‖/‖p˙iPG‖ for 20,000 regularly
spaced points on the policy simplex.
For Fig. 2a the continuous time dynamics of NeuRD (5) and PG (7) are integrated over time with step
size ∆t = 0.1 (equals 1 iteration). The figure shows the mean NASHCONV of 100 trajectories starting
from initial conditions sampled uniformly from the policy simplex. The shaded area corresponds to
the 95% confidence interval computed with bootstrapping from 1000 samples.
For Fig. 2b, in every iteration, each information-state policy over the entire game was updated for
both players in an alternating fashion, i.e., the first player’s policy was updated, then the second
player’s [13, Section 4.3.6] [14]. The only difference between the NeuRD and PG algorithms in this
case is the information-state logit update rule, and the only difference here–as described by (4)–is
that PG scales the NeuRD update by the current policy. The performance displayed is that of the
sequence probability time-average policy for both algorithms (see Appendix A). The set of constant
step sizes tried were the same for both algorithms: η ∈ {0.5, 0.9, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4}. The shaded
area corresponds to the 95% interval that would result from a uniform sampling of the step size from
this set.
We use the same setup detailed above for Fig. 2a for the nonstationary case shown in Fig. 3. The
payoff matrix is switched every 1000 iterations, i.e., at t = 100 and t = 200.
For each game in Fig. 4, we randomly initialize a policy parameterized by a two-layer neural neural
network (128 hidden units). Results are reported for 40 random hyperparameter sweeps for both
NeuRD and PG. We update the policy once every 4 update of the Q-function. The batch size of
the policy update is 256 trajectories, with trajectory lengths of 5, 8, and 8 for Kuhn Poker, Leduc
Poker, and Goofspiel. The Q-function update batch size is 4 trajectories (same lengths). A learning
rate of 0.002 was used for policy updates, and 0.01 for Q-value function updates. Reward function
negation occurs every 0.33e6 learning iterations, with the three reward function phases separated by
the vertical red stripes in the plots. Upon conclusion of each learning phase, policies are not reset;
instead, learning continues given the latest policy (for each of the 40 trials).
For Fig. 5, we simply compute the NASHCONV area-under-the-curve for each phase of learning in
Leduc Poker, across all entropy regularization levels, using 40 hyperparameter seeds. I.e., this plot
provides a concise summary of Fig. D.6.
With the exception of the experiments presented in Appendix D.3, all experiments were performed
on local workstations. The single-agent DMLab-30 [3] experiments were conducted using a cloud
computing platform with P100 GPUs. We performed 20 independent runs with 20 actors and
one learner per run. The hyper-parameters were sampled from the same distributions as selected
by Espeholt et al. [17] with the addition of NeuRD specific hyper-parameters ε log-uniformly sampled
in the interval [0.05, 0.5] and max-logit-gap β uniformly in the interval [5, 50].
The sample mean is used as the central tendency estimator in plots, with variation indicated as the
95% confidence interval that is the default setting used in the Seaborn visualization library that
generates our plots. No data was excluded and no other preprocessing was conducted to generate
these plots.
D.2 Additional imperfect information game results
Full results for all considered nonstationary imperfect information domains, under varying levels of
policy entropy regularization, are shown in Figs. D.6 to D.8. Increasing policy network regularization
causes the NASHCONV to be biased away from the Nash equilibrium. In every learning phase of every
domain, the lowest NASHCONV over the sweep of entropy regularization coefficients is achieved by
NeuRD.
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Figure D.6: Comparison of NeuRD and vanilla PG in Leduc Poker with different levels of entropy
regularization. The three phases corresponding to Figs. 5a to 5c are separated by the vertical dashed
red lines.
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Figure D.7: Comparison of NeuRD and vanilla PG in Kuhn Poker with different levels of entropy
regularization. The three game phases (each with a different reward function) are separated by the
vertical dashed red lines.
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Figure D.8: Comparison of NeuRD and vanilla PG in Goofspiel with different levels of entropy
regularization. The three game phases (each with a different reward function) are separated by the
vertical dashed red lines.
D.3 Single agent RL experiments
Though not considered a main focus in this paper, we also explore how NeuRD behaves in the single
agent stationary RL setting. Specifically, we consider IMPALA [17], a state-of-the-art policy gradient
based distributed learning agent, as a baseline. We replace the IMPALA policy update rule with
that of NeuRD, otherwise keeping the training procedures the same as those used by Espeholt et al.
[17]. We then compare the two algorithms in a suite of DMLab-30 [3] tasks. All IMPALA scores
correspond to the ‘experts’ (i.e., non-multitask) results reported by Espeholt et al. [17, Table B.1].
Of particular note is the rooms_select_nonmatching_object domain, where NeuRD attains a
score of 48.9± 4.0, which is significantly higher than IMPALA’s score of 7.3. We conjecture this is
due to the inherent adaptivity required on behalf of the agent to maximize its reward. In this domain,
the agent spawns in a room, and views an out-of-reach object shown in one of two displays. If the
agent reaches a specific pad in the room, it receives a +1 reward, and is spawned to a second room
with two objects, one of which was the one in the previous room. The agent receives a reward of
+10 (respectively, −10) if it collects object not matching (respectively, matching) the one in the
previous room, then respawns to the first room. The episode ends after 12 seconds. This domain
can be viewed as a contextual two-arm bandit problem, where the agent needs to learn to choose
the non-matching object based on the context provided in the first room, rather than converge to
a deterministic policy that always chooses the object that yielded the first reward. We, therefore,
conjecture that the adaptivity properties of NeuRD enable it to attain the high reward in contrast to
IMPALA. These preliminary results indicate that investigation of NeuRD’s performance in related
nonstationary single-agent settings may make for an interesting avenue of future work.
Level name Human Random IMPALA NeuRD
rooms_select_nonmatching_object 65.9 0.3 7.3 48.9±4.0
rooms_watermaze 54.0 4.1 26.9 29.8±0.4
rooms_keys_doors_puzzle 53.8 4.1 28.0 24.2±1.2
lasertag_one_opponent_small 18.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.0±0.0
lasertag_three_opponents_small 31.5 -0.1 19.1 0.0±0.0
lasertag_one_opponent_large 12.7 -0.2 -0.2 0.0±0.0
lasertag_three_opponents_large 18.6 -0.2 -0.1 0.0±0.0
explore_goal_locations_small 267.5 7.7 209.4 208.6±0.4
explore_object_locations_small 74.5 3.6 57.8 54.0±0.4
explore_object_locations_large 65.7 4.7 37.0 42.8±0.8
natlab_fixed_large_map 36.9 2.2 34.7 22.5±4.6
natlab_varying_map_regrowth 24.4 3.0 20.7 22.6±0.7
natlab_varying_map_randomized 42.4 7.3 36.1 37.2±1.3
psychlab_arbitrary_visuomotor_mapping 58.8 0.2 16.4 16.5±0.6
psychlab_continuous_recognition 58.3 0.2 29.9 30.7±0.1
psychlab_sequential_comparison 39.5 0.1 0.0 0.0±0.0
Table 1: Comparison of IMPALA and NeuRD performance in single-agent stationary RL, for various
DMLab-30 domains. Both trained for 333e6 environment frames in each domain. Human and
random results are those reported by Espeholt et al. [17]. IMPALA scores correspond to the ‘experts’
(i.e., non-multitask) results reported by Espeholt et al. [17, Table B.1]. NeuRD scores are reported
for top-3 of 20 hyperparameter seeds.
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Figure D.9: NeuRD learning curves in single-agent stationary RL, for various DMLab-30 domains.
Results reported for 20 hyperparameter seeds, with raw performance of top-3 seeds in dark blue,
mean performance of top-3 seeds in red, and remaining seeds in light blue.
